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ABSTRACT
Belarus currently has a relatively generous pay-as-you-go pension
system, but population aging coupled with recent problems with
economic growth will soon make it unsustainable. We build a rich
overlapping generation model of Belarusian economy, which
shows that without reform the Pension Fund will run into
persistent and growing deficit, which will reach 9% of GDP by
2055. We also compute the fiscal projections of several parametric
pension reforms, including the reform which will start in 2017. To
avoid a deficit without reform, pension benefits would have to be
substantially reduced. The increase of retirement age to 65 for
both genders has a strong positive effect on sustainability of the
pension system and keeps the deficit below 2% of GDP.
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1. Introduction
After the dissolution of the USSR, the majority of former Soviet Union states experienced
increases in mortality (Brainerd & Cutler, 2005; Ellman, 1994) and sharp drops in birth rates
(Adsera, 2004; Perelli-Harris, 2008). Belarus was not an exception, although the increase in
mortalitywas lesspronounced than inothernewly independent states, as the socio-economic
changes were less drastic (Grigoriev et al., 2010; Shakhotska, 2007). The health crisis of the
1990s contributed to the decline in the life expectancy, especially amongmales (Cockerham,
1997; Shakhotska, 2006). In 1999 the male life expectancy at birth was only 62.2 years (World
Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015), the lowest for the past 50 years.
In 2000s, economic growth in Belarus picked up. It was pro-poor (Haiduk & Chubrik,
2007), and living standards improved rapidly. As economic uncertainty subdued and
incomes grew, both life expectancy and fertility increased. The government also intro-
duced maternity and child benefits, and these policies contributed to an increase in ferti-
lity (Amialchuk, Lisenkova, Salnykov, & Yemelyanau, 2014). But these positive
developments were not enough to reverse the negative trend in population growth.
According to the World Bank, the Belarusian population decreased from 10.2 million in
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1991 to 9.5 million people in 2014. According to the UN population projections, it is
expected to contract to 8.1 million people by 2050. More importantly for the pension
system, the old-age dependency ratio (number of persons of retirement age per 100
workers) will almost double from 43 in 2015 to 82 in 2050 (see Figure 1).
The current pension system in Belarus is a standard one-pillar pay-as-you-go scheme.
The retirement age in Belarus is among the lowest in the region: in 2016 it was 55 years
for females and 60 for males. The contribution rate of 29%, on the other hand, is
among the highest in Eastern Europe (Zviniene & Biletsky, 2011). In 2015 the average
pension benefit exceeded the poverty level 2.37 times, and constituted 42% of an
average wage (Belstat, 2016).
Low post-war birth rates implied that in the 2000s the cohorts entering retirement were
relatively small. This favourable demographic environment allowed for a surplus in the
Pension Fund. As old-age dependency worsened, 2013 became the first year with regis-
tered Pension Fund deficit. UN population projections suggest that age dependency
will continue worsening until 2050 when it stabilizes, and Pension Fund deficits might
become unsustainable.
Belarus is currently reforming the pension system: starting from 2017 the retirement
age both for males and females will increase half a year each year, until it reaches 58
years for females and 63 for males in 2022. This paper models both the reform, as the
pre-reform (55/60 retirement age) scenario. Since none of the scenarios deliver the
balanced Pension Fund, as a third scenario we also consider a possible more radical retire-
ment age increase to 65 for both sexes.
Many developed countries face similar challenges as their populations are ageing. A
growing body of literature is analysing public pension systems with general equilibrium
overlapping generation (OLG) models. De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999), for
instance, study social security reform in the U.S. economy; Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saave-
dra (2009) study the effects of an increase in retirement age in Spain.
Figure 1. Old-age dependency ratio. Source: 2010-based UN population projections (medium
scenario).
104 K. LISENKOVA AND K. BORNUKOVA
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
rat
hc
lyd
e] 
at 
04
:45
 25
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Zviniene andBiletsky (2011) build fiscal projections for the pension systemof Belarus using
the World Bank pension reform options simulation toolkit accounting model (PROST). To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt tomodel the Belarusian pension system
in anOLG framework, taking into account general equilibrium effects of possible reforms and
macroeconomic consequences of decreasing working-age population.
We find that under the current arrangements of the public pension scheme with the
current replacement rate (average pensions at around 40% of average wage) the
Pension Fund deficits increase up to the year 2050. The ongoing reform – the increase
of the retirement age to 58/63 – will slow down the build-up of the deficit but will not
solve the problem. We also show that it will be necessary to either decrease the replace-
ment rate or increase contributions to keep the Pension Fund afloat. Delaying retirement,
in particular for women, is another option, which not only improves the sustainability of
the Pension Fund, but also benefits GDP growth by increasing the labour supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of
the pension system in Belarus. In Section 3 we briefly describe the model. In Section
4 we describe the calibration of the model to Belarusian macro and micro data. Simu-
lation results and possible reform projections are described in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. The pension system in Belarus today
The current pension system in Belarus was inherited from the Soviet Union. The pension
system is redistributive or pay-as-you-go (current generations of workers pay contri-
butions, which are used in the same period to pay pensions to the current retirees).
The retirement age as of 2016 was 60 years for men and 55 years for women. These are
among the lowest pension ages in Europe, comparable only to those in Russia and some
Central Asian counties (see Table 1 for details). The only reforms of the pension system
before 2017 in Belarus were the restrictions of access to work pensions, which are now
paid only for those who contributed to the Pension Fund for at least 15.5 years (still
very low). The minimum length of contributions is currently under further increase, with
the aim to reach 20 years of contributions by 2020. In 2017 the major pension reform
started. Each year starting with 2017 the retirement age would be increased half a year,
until it reaches 58 years for females and 63 years for males by 2022. If the person does
not meet this threshold, she/he is only entitled to the social pension, paid after the age
65 for men and 60 for women. As most developed countries have moved towards the
same pension age for both sexes, Belarus remains among the group of transition countries
which still have earlier retirement age for women.
The social security contributions are paid to the Fund of the Social Protection of the
Population (here the Pension Fund). Total pension contributions are 29% of gross
wages, of which only 1% is paid directly by the employee, while the employer pays the
rest. The Pension Fund is a separate and independent from the government’s budget,
and there are mechanisms allowing the Pension Fund surpluses to be directed into the
government budget, or for the government budget to finance the deficits of the
Pension Fund.
In 2015, the total amount of pensions paid out by the Pension Fund constituted 9.6% of
GDP. This level of expenditure is similar to many European and transition countries. 2013
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was the first year of the Pension Fund deficit in Belarus – the deficit was quite small,
amounting to 0.08% of GDP; in 2015 the deficit grew to 0.39% of GDP.
The replacement rate (the ratio of the average pension to average wage) in Belarus is
not high compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries. The OECD average is 54.5%, while the Belarusian replacement rate
was 42% in 2015. The average pension in Belarus in 2015 was 2.806 mln Belarusian
roubles, or 177 USD. According to the law, public pensions are indexed to average wage.
Given the demographic challenges ahead, Belarus needs to reform its pension system.
These changes can be parametric – changing only the features of the current pay-as-you-
go system – or structural. In this paper, we focus on the sustainability of the current system
and the possible parametric reforms.
3. The model
The model used in this paper is designed to analyse the long-term economic implications
of demographic change in spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The exogenous demo-
graphic process is superimposed on the model and provides the shock or driving force
behind the simulation results. The model is calibrated on the Belarusian data. Below we
describe the demographic structure of the model and outline the main features of the pro-
duction, household and government sectors.
3.1. Demographic structure
The population is divided into 21 generations or age groups (i.e. 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19,
… , 100–104). Demographic variables, fertility, mortality and net-migration rates are
Table 1. Statutory retirement age across countries as of 2011.
Transition countries Developed countries
Armenia 63 Australia 67
Azerbaijan 58/63 Austria 65
Belarus 55–58/60–63 Belgium 65
Bulgaria 60/63 Canada 65
Croatia 60/65 Denmark 67
Czech Republic 55–61/62.5 Finland 65
Estonia 60.5/63 France 65
Georgia 60/65 Germany 67
Hungary 62 Greece 65
Kazakhstan 58/63 Iceland 67
Kyrgyz Republic 58/63 Ireland 65/66
Latvia 62 Israel 67
Lithuania 60/62.5 Italy 60/65
Moldova 57/62 Japan 65
Poland 60/65 Netherlands 65
Romania 59/64 New Zealand 65
Russian Federation 55/60 Norway 67
Serbia 60/65 Portugal 65
Slovak Republic 59.5/62 Spain 65
Slovenia 56.3/63 Sweden 65
Turkmenistan 57/62 Switzerland 64/65
Ukraine 55–60/60 U.K. 68
Uzbekistan 55/60 U.S. 67
Source: Pallares-Miralles, Romero, and Whitehouse (2012).
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assumed to be exogenous. Every cohort is described by two indices. The first is t, which
denotes time. The second is g, which denotes a specific generation or age group.
The size of the cohort belonging to generation g + k in any period t is given by the fol-
lowing two laws of motion:
Po pt,g+k=
Po pt1,g+k+5 frt1 for k = 0,
Po pt1,g+k1(srt1,g+k1 +mrt1,g+k1) for k [ [1, 20].
{
(1)
The first equation simply implies that the number of children born at time t (age
group g + k = g, i.e. age group 0–4) is equal to the size of the first adult age group
(g + k + 5 = g + 5, i.e. age group 20–24) at time t−1 multiplied by the ‘fertility rate’, fr,
in that period.1 If every couple has two children on average, the fertility rate is approxi-
mately equal to 1 and the size of the youngest generation g at time t is approximately
equal to the size of the first adult generation g + 5 one year before. A period in
the model corresponds to five years and a unit increment in the index k represents
both the next period, t + k, and, for an individual, and a shift to the next age group,
g + k.
The second law of motion gives the size at time t of any age group, g + k, beyond the
first generation, as the size of this generation a year ago times the sum of the age-specific
conditional survival rate, sr, and the net-migration rate, mr, at time t−1. In this model the
fertility rates vary across time, while the survival and net-migration rates vary across time
and age. For the final generation (i.e. the age group 100–104 (k = 20)), the conditional sur-
vival rate is zero. This means that everyone belonging to the oldest age group in any
period dies with certainty at the end of the period.
Time variable fertility and time/age-variable net-migration and conditional survival
rates are calibrated based on exogenous population projections. This permits a precise
modelling of the demographic scenarios of any configuration within the model.
3.2. Production
At any time t, a representative firm hires labour and rents physical capital to produce a
single good using a Cobb–Douglas technology. The production function thus reads:
Yt = AtK
a
t L
1a
t , (2)
where Y denotes output, K is physical capital, L denotes effective units of labour, A
is a scaling factor and α represents the share of physical capital in output.
The market in which the representative firm operates is assumed to be perfectly com-
petitive. Factor demands thus follow from the solution to the profit maximization
problem:
ret = aAt
Kt
Lt
( ){a1}
, (3)
wt = (1 a)At
Kt
Lt
( )a
, (4)
where re and w denote the rental rate of capital and the wage rate, respectively.
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3.3. Household sector
Household behaviour is captured by 21 representative households that interact in an
Allais–Samuelson overlapping generations structure representing each of the age
groups. Individuals enter the labour market at the age of 20, retire at the age of 65 and
die at the latest by the age of 104. Younger generations (i.e. 0–4, 5–9, 10–14 and 15–
19) are fully dependent on their parents and play no active role in the model. However,
they do influence the public expenditure. An exogenous age/time-variable survival rate
determines life expectancy.
Adult generations (i.e. age groups 20–24, 25–29,… , 100–104) optimize their consump-
tion-saving patterns over time. The household’s optimization problem consists of choos-
ing a profile of consumption over the life cycle that maximizes a constant elasticity of
substitution inter-temporal utility function, subject to the lifetime budget constraint.
The inter-temporal preferences of an individual born at time t are given by
U =
1
1 u
∑20
k=4
P
k
l=4
1
1+ rg+l
[ ]
P
k
m=0
srt+m,g+m((Cl+k,g+k)
1+u)
{ }
, (5)
where C denotes consumption and u represents the inverse of the constant inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution. Parameter r is the pure rate of time preference, and is age-vari-
able.2 Future consumption is also discounted at the unconditional survival rate,∏
k srt+k,g+k , which is the probability of survival up to the age g + k and period t + k. It is
the product of the age/time-variable conditional survival rate, srt + k,g + k, between
periods t + k and t + k + 1 and ages g + k and g + k + 1.
The household is not altruistic, i.e. it does not leave intentional bequests to children. It
insures its future via a perfect annuity market, as described theoretically by Yaari (1965,
case C) and implemented in an OLG context by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006).
The household’s dynamic budget constraint takes the following form:
HAt+1,g+1 =
1
srt,g
× [YLt,g(1 t
L
t  Ctrl)+ Penst,g + (1+ rt[1 t
K ])HAt,g  [1+ t
c]Ct,g], (6)
where HA is the level of household assets, r is the rate of return on physical assets, τK is the
effective tax rate on capital, τL the effective tax rate on labour, τC the effective tax rate on
consumption, Ctr is the contribution rate to the public pension system, YL is the labour
income, Pens is the level of pension benefits.
The intuition behind the term 1/sr is that the assets of those who die during period t are
distributed equally between their surviving peers. Therefore, if the survival rate at time t in
age group g is less than one, then at time t + 1 everyone in their group has more assets.
This is the mathematical description of the perfect annuity market.
Labour income is defined as
YLt,g = wtEPt,gLSt,g, (7)
where LS is the exogenously given supply of labour. It is assumed that labour income
depends on the individual’s age-specific productivity. In turn, it is assumed that these
age-specific productivity differences are captured in age-earnings profiles. These
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productivity profiles are quadratic functions of age:
EPt,g = g+ (l)g (c)g
2, g, l, c  0, (8)
with parametric values estimated from micro data (as discussed in the calibration section).
Differentiating the household utility function, subject to its lifetime budget constraint, with
respect to consumption yields the following first-order condition for consumption, com-
monly known as Euler equation:
Ct+1,g+1 =
[1+ [1 tK ]rt+1
(1+ rt)
[ ]1/u
Ct,g. (9)
It is important to note that, since survival probabilities are present in both the utility
function and the budget constraint, they cancel each other out and are not present in
the Euler equation.
3.4. Investment and asset returns
The law of motion for the capital stock, Kstock, is:
Kstockt+1 = Invt + (1 d)Kstockt , (10)
where Inv represents investment, δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Capital markets are assumed to be fully integrated. This implies that financial capital is
undifferentiated from physical capital, so that the no arbitrage condition holds:
1+ rt = ret + (1 d), (11)
where r and re denote the net and gross rates of return to physical capital, respectively.
3.5. Government sector
The Government’s budget constraint reads:∑
g
Popt,g {(t
L
t + Ctrl)wtEPt,gLSt,g + t
cCt,g + rtHAt,g} = Govt +
∑
g
Po pt,g Penst,g, (12)
where Gov is public consumption. The left-hand side of the constraint contains the gov-
ernment revenues. The right-hand side represents different categories of government
expenditure, including transfers to households and pension benefits. Note that the
pension programme in our model is a part of the overall government budget, and trans-
fers from the general government budget finance the Pension Fund deficits, which is
defined as the difference between the total pension contributions collected and the
total pension benefits paid out.
Public expenditures per person (GEPC) are fixed per person and hence total expendi-
ture (Gov) depends only on the size of the total population (TPop).
Govt = TPo ptGEPC. (13)
In the simulations presented in this paper, we use the wage tax rate, tLt , as the only
endogenous policy variable that adjusts in every period to achieve a balanced government
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budget. Wage tax does not generate efficiency distortions, given the absence of an
endogenous labour–leisure decision.
3.6. Market and aggregation equilibrium conditions
Perfect competition is assumed in all markets. The equilibrium condition in the goods
market requires that the Belarus’ output be equal to aggregate absorption, which is the
sum of aggregate consumption, investment and government spending:
Yt =
∑
g
Po pt,gCt,g + Invt + Govt. (14)
Labour market clearing requires that the demand for labour be equal to the supply:
Lt =
∑
g
Po pt,gLSt,gEPg. (15)
Similarly, the units of capital accumulated up to period t must equal the units of capital
demanded by the representative firm in that period:
Kstockt = Kt. (16)
In the same vein, equilibrium in the financial market requires total stock of private wealth
accumulated at the end of period t to be equal to the value of the total stock of capital
accumulated at the end of period t:∑
g
Po pt,gHAt,g = Kstockt. (17)
4. Calibration
The model is calibrated using 2013 data for Belarus where available. The data for the
demographic baseline shock are taken from the 2010-based medium population projec-
tions produced by the United Nations Population Division (United Nations, 2010). Popu-
lation projections are used for the calibration of the fertility and survival rates used in
the model.
The data on public finances and GDP components are taken from the National Accounts.
The effective labour income, capital and consumption tax rates are calculated from the cor-
responding government revenue categories and calibrated tax bases. Data on total amount
of pensions are taken from the Pension Fund budget. Based on this information, the effec-
tive pension contribution rate and the average size of pension benefits can be calculated.
The average pension per person is obtained by dividing the total amount of pension
benefits by the total number of people of pension age. In a baseline scenario, males start
receiving pension benefits at the age of 60 and females at the age of 55.
The source of the labour market data is the Belarusian Household Budget Survey 2013
(BHBS). Two labour market characteristics are derived from the data: age-specific employ-
ment rates and age-specific productivity profiles. The latter are estimated via the use of
quadratic age-earning regressions.
Figure 2 shows employment rates by age and sex. Employment is very high – in the
region of 90% – until the pension age, at which point it plummets. As expected, female
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employment rates begin to fall five years earlier than male because of lower state pension
age.
In the baseline scenario we assume that there is total factor productivity (TFP) growth of
1.5% per year for the next 100 years.3 The (five-year) inter-temporal elasticity of substi-
tution is set to 1.25. The number is calibrated to the range of values reported in Havranek,
Horvath, Irsova, and Rusnak (2015) and Havránek (2015), with the adjustment correspond-
ing to the five-year period length in our model. The wage rate is a numeraire. Other model
parameters are calibrated.
The calibration procedure is a sequence of three steps.
In the first step using the information on GDP, capital and labour earnings we calculate
the scaling parameter in the production function and the capital income share.
The second step is the most challenging one since it involves equations describing the
household’s optimization problem, the equilibrium conditions in the assets and goods
markets and the government budget constraint. In particular, the rate of time preference
is solved endogenously during the calibration procedure in order to generate plausible
consumption and capital ownership profiles for each age group. Capital ownership profiles
must also satisfy the equilibrium condition on the asset market.
The third and final step uses the calibration results of the first three steps to verify that
the model is able to replicate the observed data corresponding to the initial equilibrium.
Only when the initial equilibrium is perfectly replicated by the calibration solution can the
model be used to evaluate the consequences of exogenous shocks/policy experiments.
5. Simulations and results
In all scenarios presented below, population projections provide the main shock to the
model. In addition wemake assumptions about the pace of economic growth and the con-
figuration of the pension system.
Figure 2. Employment rates by age and sex.
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Pay-as-you-go pension systems can be described by three broadly defined character-
istics: level of contributions, level of benefits and number of retired. Our model inevitably
has to simplify many complexities of the Belarusian pension system. We use three par-
ameters as proxies for the above-mentioned characteristics of the pension system: contri-
bution rate, replacement rate (ratio of average pension to average wage) and state
pension age. By adjusting them we can see what effect this will have on the future stability
of the pension system. Since the current contribution rate at 29% of labour income is
already one of the highest in Eastern Europe (Zviniene & Biletsky, 2011), we do not con-
sider any scenarios that require a further increase.
5.1. Baseline scenario
For the baseline scenario, we use the UN medium population projections for Belarus for
2010–2110. After 2110, population size and age-sex structure are assumed to stay con-
stant. We assume TFP growth of 1.5% per year over the next 100 years and 0% thereafter.
Pension age for females/males stays at 55/60 years. This can be thought of as a status-quo
scenario, as we do not change the current parameters of the pension system.
Due to assumed technological progress, in the baseline scenario GDP in Belarus
increases almost 2 times over the next 50 years. To illustrate the effect of population
ageing, Figure 3 shows GDP, GDP per person and inputs of production relative to the scen-
ario with the same TFP growth but without ageing. Due to the changes in age structure by
2060, GDP, labour and capital supply decline by 41%, 43% and 37% correspondingly. GDP
per person during the same period declines by 16% and stabilizes after that.
Projecting the level of pension benefits into the future requires making certain assump-
tions. Pension benefits are usually indexed to take into account improvements in stan-
dards of living. Indexation rules can be very elaborate, but two that are often used are
indexation to wages or GDP growth. They produce drastically different outcomes in
terms of sustainability of the pension system and living standards of the retired.
Figure 3. GDP and inputs of production, relative to scenario without ageing.
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Figure 4(a) illustrates the difference between the two types of indexation by showing the
amount of total pension benefits as a share of GDP. In 2013, total pension benefits
amounted to 9% of GDP. If pensions are indexed to wages, then by 2050 the total
pension bill would reach 18% of GDP. But if pensions are indexed to GDP, they would
increase to only 12% of GDP.
If contributions are not increased in line with the pension bill, this leads to a corre-
sponding deficit in the Pension Fund (Figure 4(b)). If pension benefits are indexed to
wages, by 2050 the deficit reaches 9% of GDP. If, on the other hand, pensions are
indexed to GDP, deficit peaks at 3% of GDP in 2050 and by the end of the century
almost disappears.
Different indexation rules have consequences not only for the financing of the pension
system, but also for the relative living standards for the retired. Currently the pensions are
indexed to wages, although the president can change the indexation rule with the Decree.
Figure 4(c) shows changes in replacement rate – ratio of average pension to average wage
– under different indexation rules. If pensions are indexed to wages, it essentially means
that replacement rate stays constant. If they are indexed to the growth rate of GDP,
however, this means that relative living standards of pensioners are deteriorating – repla-
cement rate decreases from 43% in 2013, to just 28% in 2050.
5.2. Increase in the state pension age
The previous section demonstrated that the status quo will result in a large Pension Fund
deficit. This can be mitigated by using different indexation rules, but at a cost of a
Figure 4. Effects of the change in indexation rule.
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significant reduction in the living standards of the retirees. In this section we will explore
the effect of another policy option – an increase in the state pension age. Currently Belarus
has one of the lowest state pension ages in the world – 55 years for females and 60 for
males. We look at two scenarios of state pension age increase. The first one is increase
of female state pension age from 55 to 58 and of male state pension age from 60 to 63
by 2022 (by half a year every year). The second scenario is further increase in the state
pension age for both sexes to 65 by 2026 for males and by 2036 for females.
In our model, labour supply is exogenous, and we cannot explore the changes in the
labour supply behaviour due to the retirement age increase. But we do take into
account that employment rates are declining with age even before the retirement (accord-
ing to the household survey data) and we assume that the rate of decline after the increase
of the pension age will be similar to what is observed now in pre-pension ages. Figure 5
that shows assumed age-specific employment rates in different scenarios.
Figure 6(a) demonstrates the effect of these changes on old-age dependency ratio. The
dependency ratio changes in the case of an increase in the state pension age for two
reasons: the number of working people increases, and the number of pensioners
decreases due to later retirement.
With falling dependency ratio, funding the pension system becomes much easier.
Figure 6(b) shows the size of the Pension Fund deficit. If pension age is not increased,
by 2055 the deficit reaches 9% of GDP. If pension age is increased by three years for
both sexes, the deficit in 2055 decreases to 6.6% of GDP. If the state pension age for
both sexes is increased to 65 years, the deficit at its peak in 2060 is only 3% of GDP
and later converges to 2% of GDP.
5.3. Welfare analysis
The presented results concentrate on the effects of changes to pension system on major
macroeconomic indicators and on the public finances. This choice was made because
Figure 5. Employment rates under different scenarios.
114 K. LISENKOVA AND K. BORNUKOVA
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
rat
hc
lyd
e] 
at 
04
:45
 25
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
these are the variables that are often the focus of the public debate on pensions. However,
economists often evaluate the efficacy of policies in terms of their impact on welfare. A
formal model featuring household optimization provides an opportunity to calculate
the welfare levels reached by the different cohorts. Because households are optimizing
across their lifecycle which lasts 80 years (from the age 20–24 until the age 100–104),
we have a small number of cohorts with complete life cycles. We compare welfare of
cohorts born between 1990 and 2010 under three proposed reforms – change in the
indexation rule, and two scenarios of the retirement age increase – relative to the scenario
with current pension age and indexation to wages. The results are presented in Figure 7.
In all three reform scenarios, welfare is higher than in status quo scenario. Scenarios
with increase in pension age lead to faster and higher improvement in welfare compared
with scenario with different indexation rule. Scenario with different indexation also gradu-
ally leads to higher welfare, despite much lower pension benefits. The reason for this is
rational behaviour of the households, which foresee lower pension benefits and increase
Figure 6. Effects of increasing the retirement age.
Figure 7. Welfare changes after different pension reforms, % change relative to baseline.
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their savings to compensate for that. Higher savings lead to higher level of capital and ulti-
mately higher level of output and consumption. This option in a sense is equivalent to
partial substitution of public pension for private defined contribution pensions, which is
often discussed as an alternative pension reform option. Another interesting point
about this policy scenario is that cohorts born before 1990, which already started their
working career by the time the policy change is introduced, will face lower lifetime
welfare. We cannot show them on this chart since we do not have their complete life
cycles (period before 2010 is not modelled). The reason for this lower welfare is that
their optimization choice (which they made before the new policy was introduced)
becomes sub-optimal after the policy change.
6. Concluding remarks
The process of population ageing presents a serious challenge for the Belarusian economy.
Our estimates suggest that it will result in a 16% drop from potential per capita GDP by
2050. But one of the most urgent consequences of population ageing is the persistent
deficit in the pension system.
The Pension Fund has been in the deficit since 2013, but our results suggest that deficits
will grow in the future and, under the current pension system, it will reach 9% of GDP
annually by 2055. We estimate the possible effects of two parametric reforms: decreases
in replacement rate and increases in retirement age.
We find that retirement age increase would be very effective, as it works not only
through the decrease in pension payments, but also via increases in the labour supply
and GDP. If retirement age for both males and females is increased to 65 years, the
Pension Fund deficit will not exceed 3% of GDP. Increasing the retirement age by three
years, as currently planned, will keep the deficit below 7% of GDP.
We did not look at the scenarios that involve an increase in pension contribution rate,
because it is already one of the highest in the region. Without a substantial increase in
retirement age or an increase in contributions, the replacement rate will have to decrease.
This will result in 34% reduction in the living stands of retirees relative to workers by 2055.
Notes
1. Most of the post-Soviet countries experience changes in the fertility behavior, with the first
births happening later (see, e.g. Melihovs (2014) about the Latvian experience, or Shakhotska
(2007) on Belarus). We are using existing population projections to calibrate a simplified ‘fer-
tility rate’ used in this model. It would be possible to disaggregate it and use age-specific fer-
tility rates but this would not make any difference to the demographic shock and hence our
results.
2. Several empirical studies show that individuals have the age-variable rate of time preference
(Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, & Weber, 1999; Bishai, 2004; Trostel and Taylor, 2001). Introducing
age-variable rate of time preference allows us to replicate observed bell-shaped consumption
profile. For detailed discussion, see Georges, Lisenkova, Mérette, and Zhang (2016).
3. Since pensions are indexed to the growth of wages, the TFP growth does not affect the share
of pension expenditure in GDP. Hence, the assumption on TFP growth does not affect the
results regarding the financial stability of the Pension Fund. We made simulations with 1%
growth as well, and the outcome was not significantly different.
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